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A significant number of countries – many of which are least-developed countries 
(LDCs) – are not members of the multilateral trading system (MTS) as yet, and for 
many the accession process has taken an undesirably long period of time to complete. 
This lack of participation has important implications for national and global policy 
making in the field of international trade. However, there is a growing tendency to 
disregard accession challenges and difficulties facing the weakest members of the 
international community – the LDCs. The main purposes of this article are to a) 
discuss the substantive, normative and institutional complexities and requirements 
surrounding the WTO accession process from the perspective of LDCs, b) assess the 
possible costs and benefits of joining or not joining the WTO and c) reflect on the 
challenges facing poor countries in initiating, managing and negotiating their terms of 
accession in a manner that protects and promotes their developmental and trade 
interests. The objective of accession should be viewed from the perspective of the 
long-term trade and development interests of acceding countries. Hence, every effort 
should be made not only to ensure the “universality” of the MTS but also to enhance 
informed and effective participation of acceding LDCs so they will be able to pursue 
their trade and development agendas in an increasingly complex and overly entrenched 
multilateral trading system.    
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I. Introduction 
ccession to the multilateral trading system is not new. In fact, the early phases of 
multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) were dominated by accession negotiations.
1 However, with the 
transformation of the GATT into the World Trade Organisation, accession processes 
have become more challenging, complex and costly. This is mainly due to significant 
differences between the GATT and the WTO even though the ultimate objective of the 
multilateral trading system (MTS) under both systems remains the same.
2 Irrespective 
of the growing criticism of and public discontent with the WTO, and despite the 
complexities surrounding the agreements it oversees, there has been an increasing 
recognition of the importance of the “universality” of the MTS, as evidenced by an 
unprecedented expansion of membership. Currently, developing countries form two-
thirds of the WTO membership despite complex and costly accession negotiations 
confronting them.  
The difficulties facing least-developed countries (LDCs) in WTO accession are 
especially challenging in part because of structural, technical and institutional 
weaknesses inherent in their economies and in part due to a growing complexity of the 
trading system and cumbersome accession requirements. Out of the current 50 
countries within the LDC group, 18 are not members
3 of the WTO, and of the 18 
countries that have acceded to the organisation since its establishment in 1995, only 2 
are from the LDC group (Cambodia and Nepal). Currently, about 24 countries are in 
the process of accession; of these, 8 are LDCs. Ten other LDCs have not yet submitted 
their accession requests to the organisation.  
This article assesses the process of WTO accession from a historical perspective 
as well as with regard to the institutional and technical complexity of the process; it 
also attempts to provide economic and political rationale for joining the WTO, reflects 
on the challenges facing LDCs in the process and puts forward policy conclusions for 
consideration at the national and international levels. The basic argument of the article 
is that accession to the WTO could be beneficial even to LDCs if they are allowed to 
join the multilateral trading system on terms and conditions that fully take into 
account their diverse levels of development. Lack of membership and absence of 
meaningful participation will only intensify further the marginalization of these 
countries from the MTS and the global economy. The article further argues that 
accession to the WTO should not be cumbersome to poor countries nor should it be 
unduly accelerated: there should be a reasonably sufficient time for accession 
initiation, preparation and learning. Also, the pace of accession negotiations should be 
determined by and take into consideration the diverse levels of institutional, financial 
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and technical capacities of acceding countries. Generally, countries that are in WTO 
accession negotiations should confront several questions: Why would a country or 
countries opt to join the WTO? What are the implications and impacts of specific 
WTO agreements
4 for the economic prospects of acceding countries? What is the 
balance between advantages (benefits) and disadvantages (costs) of joining or not 
joining the WTO? What are the possible institutional and normative implications of 
acceding to the WTO? And how can accession commitments and obligations be made 
consistent with national development policies, strategies and priorities? Serious 
accession preparations at the national level should make attempts to respond to these 
questions before countries submit their accession applications to the WTO. 
II. Cost-benefit considerations: How should costs and 
benefits of WTO accession be assessed? 
t is difficult to quantify accurately the economic benefits and costs associated with 
membership in the WTO. One of the difficulties arises from the fact that political 
considerations have, in most cases, been more the driving forces for accession 
requests than have calculations of economic costs and benefits. As noted by Hoekman 
and Kostecki (1997), the fact that trade policy makers are driven as much by internal 
and national political concerns as by economic considerations affects their choice of 
criteria and thus decision outcomes in accession negotiations.
5 It is in this context that 
one must contemplate how to provide qualitative assessment of potential benefits and 
possible costs of WTO membership. 
a. What are the potential benefits of joining the WTO? 
Proponents of WTO accession argue that there are several good reasons for or benefits 
from joining the World Trade Organisation. According to these views: 
1.  Upon accession, like any member countries, LDCs are entitled to full WTO 
treatment, as countries that maintained discriminatory trade measures are obliged to 
remove such measures after the conclusion of accession negotiations and the 
ratification of the protocol of accession. Through membership, acceding countries will 
have unrestricted access to most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment and benefits, 
which are the outcomes of several previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. 
However, it is important to note that in the current circumstances LDCs, irrespective 
of their membership in the WTO, face relatively less trade discrimination in the 
markets of their major trading partners.  
2.    A predictable and transparent multilateral trading system could provide security to 
international support measures granted to weaker trading partners (e.g., special and 
differential, or S&D, treatment and full access to MFN provisions), as such measures 
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could not be easily or unilaterally revoked (or withdrawn). In this regard, a predictable 
and stable multilateral trading system is better than unilateral or bilateral trade 
relations. Acceding countries could also have access to trade policies of and related 
information about their trading partners through mechanisms established in the MTS 
such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).
6 One problem, however, is that 
the S&D treatments contained in the WTO agreements are, by and large, best-
endeavour clauses (not binding commitments). 
3.   Weaker trading partners such as the LDCs could benefit from a rule-based and 
predictable multilateral trading system, which could in turn engender more 
transparency and predictability in domestic policies and strategies. Predictable and 
stable domestic policies can help foreign and domestic investors to engage in the 
production and supply of goods and services. However, empirical and historical 
evidence suggests that China was the second largest destination, after the United 
States, for foreign investments before it joined the WTO, whereas LDCs that have 
been members of the WTO for several years have attracted insignificant foreign 
investment flows to their economies. 
4.    Membership in the WTO allows countries to design their development strategies 
and trade policies in a more predictable international trading environment that can 
provide them with expanded trading opportunities. Many of the trading opportunities 
created by the WTO, such as market access for goods and specific commitments on 
agriculture and services, are contingent upon membership in the organization; this 
entails high opportunity costs for non-members (UNCTAD, LDCR, 1998). However, 
there are still high tariffs maintained by LDCs’ trading partners on exports of interest 
to these countries. Similarly, market entry is always a problem for LDC exports due to 
a number of non-tariff measures, especially in developed-country markets, although 
market access conditions for poor countries in developed-country markets are 
supposed to be relatively favourable for their exports. Moreover, LDCs have limited 
productive and supply capacities, constraining their ability to take full advantage of 
market access offers and expanded trade opportunities created by the WTO. 
5.  Least-developed countries need constant interactions with the international 
community in general and with their trading and development partners in particular. 
This is because their national policy-making and development processes are closely 
linked to and heavily influenced by international policies and strategies (Helleiner, 
2002). For WTO sceptics this is more a problem than an advantage, in part due to 
excessive “dependency syndrome” and in part because the national policy-making 
space of LDCs is crowded by international policies and related external factors. For   M. Delelegn 
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instance, trade rules that result from long and protracted negotiations will eventually 
impose obligations on countries that accede to the organisation at later stages.  
6.  Membership can provide countries with the opportunity to participate in 
multilateral trade rule-making and standard-setting processes. This is important, as 
member countries, including LDCs, are expected to comply with international rules 
and standards in their trading and other economic relationships with the world 
community. In the process LDCs could also improve their trade-negotiating and rule-
making capacities and benefit from the exchange of best practices with member 
countries in the implementation of WTO agreements. However, the participation of 
LDCs in trade negotiations is limited by lack of financial resources and limited 
technical capacities in their domestic institutions. 
7.     In the WTO, unlike the Bretton Woods institutions, decisions are taken largely by 
negotiation and consensus
7 and hence consensus building is central in trade and other 
economic negotiations. The WTO provides “equal opportunity” for all members to 
negotiate multilateral trade agreements. Decision by consensus is important for at 
least three substantive reasons: first, at face-value, it is not economic power or trade 
share that determines the ultimate outcome of trade negotiations, but rather the 
technical and substantive implications of the issues involved as well as the levels of 
preparedness for negotiations. These are key requirements to guarantee, to some 
extent and in principle, the relative fairness of the ultimate outcome of trade 
negotiations. Second, all member countries have roles to play in rule- and decision-
making processes so long as the challenges and key conditions discussed above are 
met. Hence, decisions are collective in nature and so is the responsibility to ensure 
objective and balanced outcomes of the negotiations. Third, decisions on which there 
is divergence of positions and interests are not subject to adoption, i.e., only decisions 
on which there are no differences of opinion or position and, consequently, which 
have a good chance of being implemented, are made (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 
1997). Therefore, legally all members have equal rights of participation and the same 
level of influence on the outcome of the negotiations. It is in this connection that the 
quality of a country’s institutions and human capital can be of significant value in 
determining its effective influence and in protecting its stake in the MTNs. But the 
reality is far from the above intentions and principles, as power play remains a 
dominant face in multilateral trade negotiations (for more details see point 7 in section 
b. below) 
b. What are the possible costs of joining the WTO? 
Opponents of accession to the WTO, on the other hand, argue that the costs of such 
membership are substantial and disproportionate to the benefits enumerated by the   M. Delelegn 
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proponents, particularly for the LDCs. Their basic arguments relate, mainly, to the 
growing complexity of the accession process, the inability of weaker and smaller 
countries to balance their rights and obligations in the system, and the continuously 
expanding sphere and extent of influence of WTO rules on national policies and 
strategies. According to these opponents, the inherently weak and vulnerable 
economic structures and institutions at the national level in LDCs and the complexity 
of the MTS are responsible for the unbalanced and one-sided influence of external 
factors on domestic policies. The “vulnerability of LDCs and other weaker trading 
members to external shocks and their inability to influence the rules of the global 
economic system or the manner in which such rules are implemented can involve 
them in severe costs”.
8 For this school of thought the possible costs (disadvantages) of 
WTO accession include the following: 
1.   Adjustment costs such as institutional set-up costs, financial outlays related to 
initiation, preparation and management of accession negotiations, potential costs of 
compliance with international rules and opportunity costs resulting from diversion of 
resources from other immediate priorities. Membership may also call for reforming 
(adjusting) existing institutions and/or creating new ones, which means additional 
financial and technical burdens for poor countries.  
2.    Loss of government revenues – specific concessions on tariff rates that the newly 
acceding countries are obliged to make might adversely affect government revenue 
and domestic industries. On the other hand, newly acceding countries are not entitled 
to request additional benefits or concessions in excess of those stipulated in the 
multilateral trade agreements including tariff concessions and commitments on trade 
in services from WTO members.  
3.     Accession may result in potential political and policy costs to acceding countries, 
which in particular relate to reduced policy autonomy for governments, with possible 
negative impacts on national development policies and priorities. For example, 
countries upon accession are obliged to gradually eliminate discriminatory WTO-
inconsistent trade and investment measures within an agreed and specified time frame. 
Accession may also create social tensions at the national level resulting from inability 
of governments to build consensus between and among different groups (e.g., between 
environmentalists and reformists or between producers/sellers and consumer 
protection groups).  
4.  Sceptics also argue that acceding countries are expected to allow foreign 
investment in their service sectors such as telecommunications, banking, insurance 
and professional services, within a specified period of time, with a share of foreign 
ownership progressively reaching 49 per cent of the total investment (for more details   M. Delelegn 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  187 
see UNCTAD, 2002). They are also obliged to go beyond Article XVII of the GATT 
on state-owned trading enterprises and Article III of the GATT 1994 on non-equal 
treatment of domestic and foreign firms and individuals.
9 Liberalization that would 
open the market to international and powerful companies and individuals in the 
production and export (or supply) of goods and services could have direct impacts on 
domestic infant industries and firms. 
5.   Weak capacity to make full use of WTO mechanisms – LDCs after joining the 
WTO could face enormous challenges in making full and effective use of existing 
institutional arrangements of the WTO in order to protect their trade interests. For 
instance, in the case of trade disputes between an LDC and a major trading power, the 
former is unable or faces enormous challenges to initiate dispute case(s). Use of the 
dispute settlement mechanism involves substantial legal costs, and experience so far 
has shown that it takes a long time to legally initiate disputes and more than 28 
months before dispute cases are settled (ibid., 5). Even if the case in dispute is settled 
in favour of an LDC, the right of the affected country can be restored only from the 
time that the case is settled – there is no compensation for the trade losses resulting 
from unjustified trade-distorting measures. 
6.    Operational problems related to S&D
10 provisions – as shown above, most of the 
S&D treatment provisions in favour of LDCs remain “best endeavour” clauses, which 
are not legally binding. These provisions were initially supposed to balance the rights 
and obligations and, hence, to address implementation problems of developing 
countries. 
7.   Power play in decision-making processes – the so-called consensus decision-
making process is not free from power bias. This is because, first, although consensus 
building has been at the centre of MTNs and the functioning of the system since its 
inception, there is implicit but nonetheless effective veto power where major trading 
and economic powers exert enormous pressures over the negotiations and their 
outcomes. The EU, Japan, Canada and the United States, which account for a 
substantial amount of world trade and output, have enormous influence not only on 
the outcome of but also on setting the agenda for negotiations (see Helleiner, 2002). 
Second, consensus decisions are collective and as such all member countries 
irrespective of their levels of development and participation in the process are legally 
bound by the outcomes of the decision-making process. Finally, consensus also means 
that decisions or rules that are once adopted by consensus may not be subject to 
renegotiation unless all member states or the majority agree to do so. In addition to the 
power play in trade negotiations, poor countries face financial, human, institutional 
and technical resource problems that hinder their effective participation in trade   M. Delelegn 
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negotiations. Further problems arise from the systemic and institutional complexities 
inherent in the WTO, which undermine potential benefits from and participation of 
poor countries in consensus-building processes. 
III. Issues of relevance in WTO accession negotiations: 
Why is the WTO accession process so complex and 
why does it pose difficulties for LDCs? 
ccession to or membership in the WTO is distinctly complex as compared to 
membership in other global institutions in a) the institutional, technical and 
substantive requirements at the national level for initiation and management of 
accession processes, b) the scale and magnitude of vested interests not only of the 
acceding countries but also of the major trading partners of the WTO, c) the level and 
intensity of scrutiny of national trade policies of countries involved in accession 
processes, d) the form and structure of accession negotiations, duration and financial 
costs the process requires and e) the scope and coverage of the WTO agreements that 
require careful and close examination by acceding countries. The confluences of these 
and related factors as expounded below render accession processes more complex and 
onerous.  
1.   The WTO builds upon the organisational structure that existed under the GATT 
auspices as of the early 1990s (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995). However, most of 
the countries now involved in accession processes had never been fully associated 
with the workings of the then General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Consequently, 
the existing financial, technical, institutional and regulatory gap separating these 
countries from GATT-associated countries is extremely wide. LDCs that have been 
outside of the system for so long are not familiar with the formal rules and the 
informal norms that are key in reshaping and expanding the MTS. These countries 
also lack institutions and regulations that are compatible with the MTS.  
2.   The rules governing the MTS and the agreements that the WTO oversees have 
been significantly enlarged beyond the scope of international trade. That is, the 
organisation has already become a global institution of unlimited influence on the 
national rule- and policy-making processes with regard to not only trade in goods but 
also trade in services as addressed by the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), and intellectual property rights as addressed by the Agreement on Trade-
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The WTO itself “does not 
embody substantive rules regarding government policies – it is simply a formal 
institutional structure under whose auspices Members negotiate and implement trade 
agreements and the rules contained in the treaties that it oversees (GATT, GATS, 
TRIPS).”
11 The expansion of trade agreements beyond the scope of traditional trade 
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issues under the WTO has undoubtedly added to the complexity of the MTS and of 
the accession process itself. In this context, it is interesting to note that engaging in 
accession negotiations to the WTO under Article XII
12 is a much more complicated 
undertaking than was accession to the GATT 1947.  
3.  The complexity of the trade agreements involving several areas, in turn 
necessitates a critical mass of resources for building institutional and human resource 
capacities in acceding LDCs to equip them to handle the complex and parallel tracks 
of accession negotiations. Currently, acceding countries should go through 
multilateral, plurilateral and/or bilateral negotiations.
13 There are technical, 
substantive and sometimes political problems arising from the various negotiating 
areas. Therefore, acceding LDCs with limited resources and expertise face daunting 
challenges to carry out negotiations in all the areas . 
4.     In addition to the enlargement of the scope and coverage of WTO agreements, 
the GATT and now the WTO underwent quantitative transformations – from 23 
contracting parties in 1947 to 147 member states in 2003. Such an unprecedented 
expansion in membership is generally viewed as a sign of increasing credibility and 
viability of the system, which will lead to a truly universal organisation. With such an 
enlarged membership, accession negotiations become more complex and challenging. 
This is largely due to the vested systemic and economic interests of all countries on 
the one hand, and differences in the levels of their economic development on the 
other. Understanding of the diversities of WTO membership, trade interests and 
negotiating positions is critical for the success of accession negotiations. This is 
because each and every country’s protocol of accession contains specific 
commitments that newly joining countries are expected to strictly observe. In practice 
this means that “each of the Protocols of Accession of the countries which are already 
members of the WTO (currently 147) also binds new members to observe specified 
commitments either set out in the text of the Protocol itself, or more frequently, in the 
relevant working party’s commitment paragraphs which are incorporated in the 
Protocol of Accession.”
14 This not only is cumbersome in itself but also results, for 
newly acceding LDCs, in the assumption of obligations, through the commitment 
paragraphs, that are not contained in the WTO agreements.  
5.    The increased number of players in the MTS not only results in an increase in 
“transaction costs” associated with accession negotiations but also creates further 
challenges, especially in determining the optimal choice of issues for decision in 
relation to parties in accession negotiations. This choice entails trade-offs between the 
number and types of players and the possibility of achieving comprehensive and 
balanced agreement.
15 For example, in accession negotiations and subsequent WTO   M. Delelegn 
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ministerial conferences,
16 several WTO members have consistently argued that “they 
have the right to expect that acceding countries, irrespective of their level of 
development, observe a standstill on WTO-inconsistent trade measures and on tariff 
increases during accession negotiations and that applicants should not wait until 
completion of such negotiations to bring their legislation into conformity with the 
WTO rules.”
17 
6.   Attempts to strike a balance between the special socio-economic conditions of 
acceding countries (such as the LDCs) and the need to maintain the credibility of the 
WTO system constitute another factor that complicates accession negotiations. For 
example, there is an increasing level of apprehension among countries that are already 
members of the WTO and that do not wish to entertain any possibilities of “bending” 
the rules for the sake of accommodating the unique circumstances of the weakest 
members of the international community – the LDCs. This group of countries not only 
intend to defend the credibility of the WTO rules but also fear possible “erosion or 
diversion” of the benefits entitled to them by the WTO agreements. There are 
countries (including many from the developing world) that have explicitly stated their 
opposition to “automatic granting” of the special and differential treatment (S&D) 
provisions, particularly those related to transition periods for newly acceding LDCs 
and others. Recall that during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations developing 
countries persistently advocated the need for S&D provisions including transition 
periods,
18 which are found in the current WTO agreements.  
7.   Lack of clear terms of accession and cut-off dates for completion of membership 
negotiations is a further challenge facing countries in the accession process. It is 
surprising to note that, despite the fact that accession has been part and parcel of 
multilateral trade negotiations since 1947, there are no standard and clear terms of 
accession or deadlines for completion of accession negotiations. It has taken close to 
20 years for China to complete its accession process. Nepal and Cambodia completed 
only after a toilsome process that took them, respectively, 15 and 10 years. The Sudan, 
Vanuatu and Lao PDR have not finalised their accession negotiations after spending 9, 
8 and 7 years, in that order (for more details see WT/ACC/11/Rev.3, 29 August 2003). 
The terms of accession for each of these countries are also substantially different from 
one another. Cambodia obtained a total of 15 years transition period (5 for customs 
valuation, 3 for technical barriers to trade, 4 for sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures 
and 3 for TRIPS), whereas Vanuatu, which is at a relatively advanced stage of 
accession negotiations, got only 3 years (1 for customs valuation and 2 for TRIPS). 
With regard to tariffs, other duties and charges, Cambodia and Vanuatu agreed to 
implement tariff offers immediately upon accession but Nepal delayed full   M. Delelegn 
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implementation of this until 2006. (On differences in terms of accession, see 
UNCTAD, LDCRs, 2004). In recognition of this inconsistency, efforts have been 
made to address this particular problem in recent years. After the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995, the “Guideline for the Accession of LDCs”
19 was adopted in December 
2002 for the first time in the history of the MTS. There was a general guideline on 
accession procedures developed under the GATT 1947
20 including the complementary 
Procedure on Accession adopted by the council of the GATT in 1993 and the note of 
the secretariat of the WTO (WT/ACC/1) of 25 March 1995 on accession procedures; 
however, these were not LDC-specific and none of these was actually negotiated by 
member states.  
There are two contradictory views on the lack of agreed standard terms of WTO 
accession. The first is the view, consistently identified by “opponents”, that the 
absence of clear terms of accession and cut-off dates for completion is a systemic 
weakness of the WTO agreements. Accordingly, absence of standard terms of 
accession prevents the organisation from becoming universal in its membership and 
imposes additional burdens on acceding countries. The second group of arguments (by 
“proponents”) holds that since the terms of accession and the cut-off dates are not 
imposed by the trade rules, there is flexibility for acceding countries to develop the 
terms and conditions of accession through negotiations with WTO members. This, it 
has been argued, will ensure a balance between rights and obligations for acceding 
countries. However, as LDCs lack technical and substantive capacities to influence the 
outcome of negotiations, they are unable to strike the right balance between 
obligations they are expected to assume upon accession and the potential benefits (the 
rights) that accrue to them from joining the MTS. 
IV. Accession to the WTO is not integration into the 
multilateral trading system, or is it? 
iven the above challenges and difficulties facing weaker trading partners, 
accession to the WTO is not an end in itself, but it can be a means to enhance 
trading opportunities and trade expansion. Accession is a formal legal commitment by 
the acceding country to comply fully with multilateral trade rules in order to benefit 
from “gains” resulting from previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations – it is a 
first step in the long, challenging and costly process of full and beneficial integration 
of LDCs into the multilateral trading system. The end of the accession process marks 
the beginning of the enforcement of commitments and concessions as well as 
compliance with WTO rules. The challenges discussed above, which are responsible 
for the unbalanced outcome of accession negotiations for LDCs, will also continue to 
severely constrain their capacity to fully implement commitments and concessions 
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they have assumed upon accession. Furthermore, because LDCs are poorly equipped 
in terms of national institutions and human and financial resources, their leverage to 
influence the outcome of trade negotiations and their capacity to implement 
commitments and concessions therefrom is severely limited. As a result, they are 
unable to translate trade opportunities arising from MTNs into concrete trade 
advantages.  
In addition to the weak institutional, financial and human resources capacities at 
the national level, the structural complexity of the WTO itself contributes to the weak 
integration of LDCs into the MTS. Currently, there are over 30 established bodies 
such as councils and standing committees and more than 20 ad hoc working groups 
and working parties in the WTO. Most of them are responsible for overseeing trade 
policy–related issues that will have direct ramifications for all member countries and 
their citizens and enterprises. This complexity presents a big challenge for LDCs as 
there is no strong technical or policy backstopping from domestic institutions for their 
disproportionately minimal representation in trade negotiations abroad. As practical 
experience shows, those who represent small and poor countries in multilateral trade 
negotiations have been working on their own – with little or no instruction from their 
respective national capitals. Moreover, the relatively secretive nature of trade 
negotiations and the way significant decisions are taken also contribute to the lack of 
meaningful participation of these countries in rule-making processes of the WTO.
21  
The reasons and problems highlighted above clearly indicate that, in the case of 
LDCs, accession to the WTO does not automatically guarantee immediate economic 
benefits. Neither does it ensure their beneficial integration into the MTS and the 
global economy. Therefore, accession to the WTO and meaningful participation of 
these countries in WTO decision-making processes require a) careful assessment of 
the rules, regulations and norms and their short- and long-term implications; b) putting 
in place necessary institutions to implement the rules not only in a manner consistent 
with the WTO obligations but also in a way that promotes and protects trade and 
development interests of acceding countries; c) building human and institutional 
capabilities to make full use of existing instruments and mechanisms such as the 
dispute settlement mechanism
22 in case of violations of trade rules; d) improving 
productive and supply capacities of these countries to take advantage of market access 
and trading opportunities created by the MTS; and e) effective participation in the 
decision-making process, including in the design and development of new rules so as 
to balance rights and obligations.    M. Delelegn 
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V. Conclusions 
his article attempts to show the complexities involved in WTO accession 
negotiations particularly from the perspective of the least-developed countries. 
Although the WTO accession process is undesirably long, costly and complex, any 
alternative to participation in the multilateral trading system could be more costly, 
insecure or unpredictable in the long run. Least-developed countries can pursue 
bilateral, plurilateral or regional trade agreements with their trading partners. Such 
agreements not only entail much higher transaction and administrative costs but also 
are easily reversible, most of the time on the basis of reasons that are beyond trade or 
economic spheres. Also, unlike multilateral trade agreements, regional or bilateral 
trade treaties have been increasingly characterized by requests for full reciprocity. 
Hence, for LDCs, bilateral or regional approaches to trade agreements cannot 
substitute for joining the multilateral trading system. In order to balance their rights 
and obligations in the MTS and fully benefit from the system, LDCs should a) 
improve their capacities to evaluate and link key provisions of the WTO agreements 
of particular interest to them to their specific circumstances; b) carefully assess the 
impact of WTO agreements on their socio-economic development; c) take into 
account political realities of domestic constituents and interest groups that can play 
important roles in terms of both assistance during the accession process and the 
eventual implementation of commitments; and d) have a realistic expectation of the 
economic benefits from their membership in the WTO. Moreover, the complexities of 
accession negotiations imply the need for, inter alia, increased allocation of resources 
including from donor budgets for supporting accession initiation and negotiations at 
the national level, revamping of domestic institutions and enhanced technical and 
capacity-building efforts including through assistance from relevant multilateral 
organisations. Donor support should also go beyond accession negotiations, as post-
accession (implementation) challenges are crucial in determining how the agreements 
are embodied in a country’s laws and procedures and how they are enforced by 
relevant national institutions. At the implementation stage, any departure from the 
commitments and concessions contained in the terms and conditions of accession (as 
defined) in the protocol of accession could be subject to the surveillance mechanisms 
established in the WTO. This makes the surveillance or dispute settlement procedures 
of the WTO essential and the precise formulations of commitments and terms and 
conditions of accession crucial.  
Least-developed countries that are undergoing the WTO accession process and 
their trading partners should also take the following realities into account: a) 
Accession to the WTO is necessary but not sufficient in itself to ensure economic 
T   M. Delelegn 
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well-being in the countries concerned – membership in the WTO alone is not a 
panacea for all development problems facing LDCs. Complementary policies such as 
investment in physical, human and organisational capital, and structural 
transformation including industrialization are required. b) WTO accession 
negotiations should not be cumbersome to poor countries nor should the process be 
“accelerated”; there should be a reasonably sufficient time for accession preparation 
and learning. c) The pace of accession negotiations should be determined by the 
institutional, financial and technical capacities of acceding countries, and any 
obligations therefrom should take into account the specific socio-economic conditions 
and needs of countries in the process of accession. d) Membership in the WTO should 
be viewed from the perspective of “qualitative integration” of acceding countries into 
the MTS but not on the basis of an implicit quest for the “universality” of the trading 
system only. 
Interested readers will find the informative example of Ethiopia’s accession 
experience to date in the technical annex to this article, which provides compelling 
and concrete evidence of the challenges and difficulties facing least-developed 
countries in the WTO accession process.   M. Delelegn 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
*  The opinions and views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the 
views of UNCTAD, and the designation and terminology used are those of the 
author. 
**  I am grateful to Messrs. Habib Ouane, Director, Special Programme for LDCs, 
LLDCs and SIDS, Marcel Namfua, Interregional Advisor (UNCTAD) and Taffere 
Tesfachew, Chief, Investment and Technology Policy Reviews Section 
(UNCTAD) for their time in reviewing the manuscript and for their extremely 
valuable comments on the subsequent versions of the paper. 
1.    The GATT, which had only 23 contracting parties (signatories to the GATT) in 
1947, embraced about 91 countries in 1986. In 1994, when the Uruguay Round 
Agreement (URA) establishing the WTO was concluded, membership grew to 
124. Currently, 147 countries are members of the WTO, with about 18 countries 
joining the organisation after its establishment in 1995. Countries and customs 
territories that were contracting parties to the GATT automatically became 
members of the WTO with the signing of the Marrakech Agreement. Those that 
were not must go through established processes of accession. Upon official 
request, countries could also assume “observer status” – with no negotiating 
power – for a limited period of time, usually for five years. 
2.    The preambles to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) and 
to the Marrakech Agreement establishing the WTO (signed in 1994) state that 
“relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with 
a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use 
of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development.” (For details see the legal text.) This important objective of the 
multilateral trading system, which was supposed to inject a “developmental 
perspective” into the system, should be seen as part of the strategic objectives of 
acceding countries, although the extent to which this provision has been taken into 
account in trade negotiations remains debatable.  
3.    Currently, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, East Timor, Ethiopia, Kiribati, Liberia, Laos PDR, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Samoa, Somalia, Sudan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yemen are LDCs that are 
not members of the WTO. 
4.    WTO agreements consisting of the rights and obligations of members are 
contained in various annexes. Annex 1 in its three distinct parts contains 
multilateral agreements on trade in goods (the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade – the GATT 1947 as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreement and the 
GATT 1994), services (the General Agreement on Trade in Services, or GATS) 
and intellectual property (the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, or TRIPS). Annex II contains the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), which consists of rules and procedures governing disputes 
arising between and among member states. Annex III contains the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM). The TPRM is a mechanism through which member   M. Delelegn 
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states have authority of surveillance of the trade and related policies of another 
member. 
5.    For instance, there is a perception that accession to the WTO can offset domestic 
social and political tensions that may result from open trade and investment 
policies (see Hoekman and Kostecki). It may also diminish the chance of 
disenfranchisement of nascent industries that need excessive protection from 
external competition resulting from liberalization. Membership can also create 
political support for governments on the part of exporting industries that could 
obtain greater access to foreign markets.  
6.    TPRM is an established means of surveillance by member states of the trade and 
related policies of other members; it provides detailed information on trade and 
development policies of member countries (see also footnote 4). 
7.    Although decisions have been taken mainly by consensus since the GATT era, to 
date there is no clear definition of “consensus”. In fact, GATT rules allow for 
formal vote in cases of a) amendments related to general principles such as most-
favoured-nation treatment (where unanimity is a requirement), b) interpretation of 
the provisions of the agreement and waiver of amber obligations (three-quarters 
majority) and c) amendments relating to issues other than general principles such 
as MFN treatment. Accession decisions are in principle by vote, and two-thirds 
majority vote is a requirement. Where not otherwise specified decisions are by 
consensus (for more details see Hoekman and Kostecki). 
8.    G. K. Helleiner, Governing Globalisation – Issues and Institutions. (Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 
9.    While article XVII of the GATT prohibits protection of state-owned enterprises, 
Article III of the GATT 1994 requires the extension of the right to trade for all 
firms including foreign firms and offering full national treatment within a 
specified period of time. 
10.  Special and differential treatment provisions are a set of agreed rights and 
privileges that are not part of legally binding commitments (except in the case of 
the TRIPS). They grant favourable market access, access to technology and longer 
implementation periods for the Uruguay Round Agreement. They therefore 
constitute strategic interest for developing and least-developed countries in 
multilateral trade negotiations, previously in the framework of the GATT, and 
now in the WTO, and are the result of increased participation of developing 
countries in the MTS. 
11.  Bernard Hoekman and Michael Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World 
Trading System, from GATT to WTO. (Oxford University Press, 1995) 
12.  Article XII contains three key paragraphs on accession:  
  1. Any state or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct 
of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, 
on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto.    M. Delelegn 
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  2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The 
Ministerial Conference shall approve the Agreement on the terms of accession by 
a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO.  
  3. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the 
provisions of that Agreement. 
13.  Multilateral negotiations on rules refer to negotiations on issues related to trade in 
goods including systemic agricultural issues, trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights, and services. Statements of facts rather than commitments, 
obligations to abide by existing WTO obligations not to have recourse to specific 
WTO provisions such as transitional periods, authorization to deviate temporarily 
from WTO rules or commitments in the schedules, and obligations to abide by 
rules created by the commitment paragraphs and not contained in WTO 
multilateral agreements that relate to such issues as privatisation and accession to 
plurilateral trade agreements will fall under this category. Bilateral negotiations in 
general deal with market access negotiations, while negotiations on agricultural 
supports and export subsidies now take place largely on a plurilateral basis, 
usually chaired by the applicant. (For more details see UNCTAD, 1998, 2000, 
2002 and the WTO note on completed accession.)  
14.  See the WTO note on completed accession (WT/ACC/10). 
15.  See Bernard Hoekman and Michael Kostecki, pp 53-83. 
16.  This matter was intensively deliberated during WTO ministerial conferences 
(Singapore, 1996; Geneva, 1998; Seattle, 1999; Doha, 2001) and in general 
council meetings of the WTO, especially those that took place in 1998, 1999 and 
2000, and remains controversial until today. 
17.  See WTO documents WT/ACC /10,WT/LDCs/SWG/IF/11/Rev.2 and 
UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/11, 2001. 
18.  The issue of special and differential treatment raised interesting points as to a) 
whether S&D provisions have in any way contributed to the development of 
developing countries, b) whether such measures were fully utilised by the 
developing countries and c) whether these provisions represent the right approach 
for developing countries to follow to advance their development interests and 
concerns in the various rounds of trade negotiations and in particular during the 
Uruguay Round.  
19.  See WTO document WT/COMTD/LDC/12. 
20.  Ibid. 
21.  The WTO has inherited “operational secrecy” from its predecessor, the GATT. 
Negotiations are shrouded in secrecy and significant decisions are taken by a 
small group of economically and politically powerful nations. The United States, 
the EU, Japan, Canada and Australia play dominant roles in such negotiations. As 
a result, decisions that have direct bearing on the entire membership of the WTO 
have been taken mainly in accordance with the influence of these powerful 
countries. “As long as developing countries acquiesce in the decisions made by 
today’s most influential global economic actors as to the agenda for change in the 
way in which international economic affairs are conducted and or the forums in 
which such change is negotiated, they will continue to face inequitable and   M. Delelegn 
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otherwise unsatisfactory outcomes.” (For more details see G. K. Helleiner et al., 
2002.) 
22.  Dispute settlement procedures may be invoked whenever a member believes that 
an action by another member has “nullified or impaired” a concession that was 
negotiated previously (i.e., tariff binding) or broken a WTO rule and impaired the 
attainment of the objectives of the GATT. The complaints to be filed could be 
“violation complaints”, “nullification complaints” or “situation complaints”. (For 
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